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In North and South Yemen, disparities in patterns of private and public ownership were far more subtle 
than the designations "capitalist" and "socialist" suggest. In contrast with Germany, their marriage 
was more a merger than a takeover. 
To 
the outside world, the unification of the two Yemens 
in 1990 resembled the German experience in minia? 
ture. North Yemen (the Yemen Arab Republic, YAR) was 
considered a laissez-faire market economy, whereas the 
South (the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, PDRY) 
was "the communist one." When, weeks ahead of Bonn 
and Berlin, San'a and Aden announced their union, 
Western commentary assumed that in Yemen, as in 
Germany, capitalist (northern) firms would buy out the 
moribund (southern) state sector and provide the basis 
for future economic growth. 
In theory, and in Germany, capitalism and socialism 
are distinguished by patterns of private and public own? 
ership of the means of production. In North and South 
Yemen, however, differences in ownership patterns were 
largely evened out by comparable access (and lack there- 
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of) to investment capital. Disparities in the relative weight 
of private and public enterprise were far more subtle than 
the designations "capitalist" and "socialist" indicate. 
Indeed, available data on private and public participation 
reveals common patterns of spending. The North's state 
sector invested more than did the private sector, while the 
South's socialist policy statements belied the increasing 
role of domestic and foreign private firms. 
Relatively poor countries situated on the periphery of 
the Arabian Peninsula's oil economy, both Yemens relied 
on labor remittances and international assistance. Both 
Yemens faced austerity when falling oil prices, compounded 
by a drop in Cold War-generated aid, reduced access to hard 
currency?until the discovery of oil in the border region 
in the mid-1980s attracted a third type of international 
capital from multinational petroleum companies. These 
forces cumulatively reduced the differences between the 
two systems and added an economic dimension to the polit? 
ical incentives for unification.1 In contrast with Germany, 
their marriage was more a merger than a takeover, for nei? 
ther was in any position to buy the other out. 
Two Economies 
Historic Yemen was a cultural entity rather than a polit? 
ical unit; its formal division stemmed from British impe? 
rialism in the South. Unlike the relatively isolated, inde? 
pendent North, where a semifeudal agrarian society 
persisted, the South developed capitalist classes, markets 
and enterprises. The major port between the Mediterranean 
and India, Aden's modern infrastructure and services 
attracted a small indigenous capitalist group, a working 
class of stevedores and industrial labor, and a small urban 
middle class, including shopkeepers and intellectuals. 
San'a, by contrast, was a center of Islamic conservatism 
ruled by a Zaydi Shi'a imam. Strict trade and investment 
restrictions protected a few monopoly importers and large 
landowners. Would-be bourgeoisie and working class aspi? 
rants escaped this restricted environment for the free port 
at Aden. The North was ripe for a kind of bourgeois revo? 
lution, opening the door to capitalist development, just 
when the South's radical anti-imperialism slammed the 
door to foreign investors. 
After the 1962 revolution and 1962-68 civil war, the 
North (the YAR) became a "no doors" economy, with few 
legal barriers to either trade or investment. Revolutionaries 
in the South after 1968 nationalized or collectivized many 
foreign enterprises, large estates and fishing boats. Whereas 
the South (the PDRY) was subsequently governed by a sin? 
gle Soviet-style Marxist party, in the absence of legal 
parties politics in the North were dominated by fluid trib? 
al, Islamic and leftist "fronts" covertly supported by other 
Arab regimes. 
The two Yemens shared a physical environment where 
household-scale cereal and livestock production employed 
most men and women. Both governments were unsure of 
their authority in the countryside, and each backed ele? 
ments of the other's opposition. The economies remained 
intertwined. In the early 1970s, the Southern bourgeoisie, 
some of them originally Northerners attracted to Aden's 
port economy, moved back north to Ta'iz, Hodeida and 
San'a, where they established businesses and held gov? 
ernment posts. After the rise in oil prices in 1973, worker 
remittances fed consumption (imported goods, residential 
construction) rather than productive investment, despite 
both regimes' efforts to mobilize these funds for agricul? 
ture and industry. 
The North was more affluent and enjoyed higher con? 
sumption of imports, but it also had far worse current 
account deficits. Although the labor force was still pre? 
dominantly agricultural, especially in the North, over half 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in both systems was gen? 
erated by services; the rate of new investment in services, 
especially government services, indicated that this trend 
would continue. The level of education and health ser? 
vices?slightly better in the South, especially for women? 
put both countries among the world's least-developed 
nations. While central planning was a goal of the leader? 
ship in the South, in the North planning was not an ideo? 
logical commitment but rather part of the documenta? 
tion required by the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank. 
Property Relations 
The South, with its colonial legacy, entered the 1960s with 
many more capitalist enterprises than North Yemen. South 
Yemeni nationalizations and land reforms created a mod? 
ern state sector, and dramatically equalized land owner? 
ship, but the economy retained many features of a tradi? 
tional agrarian economy comparable to that of North 
Yemen, which was just embarking on its first commer? 
cial and industrial projects. 
Production systems in the South included subsistence 
agriculture on family land mixed with herding on com? 
mons, sharecropping on pre-capitalist estates, and wage 
labor on modern farms. In Aden and Lahej, where own? 
ership was most distinctively class-divided, the revolu? 
tionary regime expropriated the largest holdings as well 
as religious endowments (waqf). The number of expro? 
priated estates increased from 18 to 47 between 1975 and 
1982 with the addition of some smaller properties of unpop? 
ular landlords. These state farms, with modern equipment 
and wage labor, managed most farm land in Aden gover- 
norate and nearly a third in Lahej just to the north.2 
Redistributed land, nearly two-thirds of the South's cul? 
tivated area, was classified as cooperative. Over a quar? 
ter, mostly in the east, remained private.3 
By contrast, the revolution in the North nationalized 
only the royal family's prime tracts. Over half of the large 
farms were private and were conservatively managed, fre? 
quently employing sharecrop labor and moving only slow? 
ly toward capitalist farming. Most dry land in both sys- 
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terns consisted of family-cultivated parcels or open range. 
Well into the 1980s, at least half of Yemeni farms produced 
cereals and livestock for cultivation. The only popular, prof? 
itable cash crop in the highlands was the narcotic leaf, qat, 
outlawed in the South and discouraged by the North's 
Ministry of Agriculture. 
Both regimes advocated farm mechanization, yet typ? 
ical Yemeni farmers planting sorghum or millet with their 
own draft animals on small, scattered, often terraced parcels 
were unable to profitably invest in pumps, tractors or trucks, 
even with remittance income. Each regime turned to "coop? 
eratives" around 1974, hoping to combine petty savings 
and remittances for investment in nurseries, equipment, 
repair stations, storage facilities and marketing services. 
Southern holders of redistributed land formed purchasing 
and marketing cooperatives. Sixty-odd cooperatives helped 
up to 50,000 members acquire inputs in the mid-1980s, 
but instead of moving toward full-scale cooperative farms, 
29 state farms abandoned group farming and only two pro? 
duced collectively.4 
In the North, although groups known colloquially as 
"cooperatives" built stop-gap rural infrastructure, the 20- 
odd agricultural, fishing and craft cooperatives foundered 
on difficulties in both credit and marketing.5 Unlike in the 
South, participation was purely voluntary, and often made 
no sense as an investment. While a few cooperatives prof? 
itably ran diesel stations or rented drilling rigs, most failed 
to mobilize and manage share capital. 
After nationalization, public ventures controlled 60- 
70 percent of the value of industry in the South, includ? 
ing power and water and the oil refinery (the single largest 
employer). Mixed companies produced cigarettes, batter? 
ies and aluminum utensils; wholly private firms were either 
small-scale plastic, clothing, glass, food and paper-goods 
manufacturers or traditional carpentry, metal, pottery 
or weaving industries. 
Whereas the South inherited modern plants and offices, 
the North embarked on its first modern enterprises only 
in 1970. Despite liberal investment incentives, private 
manufacturing grew slowly. An industrial complex near 
Ta'iz producing sweets, soaps and plastics, owned by the 
Hayel Saeed Anam Group, dominated large-scale private 
industry. The remaining large private factories were most? 
ly food processors or bottlers. Light industry consisted 
mainly of repair and construction "workshops" and crafts. 
Unlike in other Third World countries with a large pool 
of labor, the proximity to the Persian Gulf's oil economies 
drove wage levels up. Roughly a third of adult males were 
absent for at least a year or two during the oil boom decade 
(1974-84). The North imported not only teachers and health 
professionals but construction and hotel workers. While 
planners and international experts were initially opti? 
mistic about the investment potential of remittances, the 
class that benefited most from laissez-faire were Northern- 
based money changers and importers, middlemen to the 
migration-and-consumption cycle. The North's open import 
markets attracted a commercial bourgeoisie from the lower 
Red Sea region, resulting in a predominance of service 
sector investments. Those with cash to invest?local 
traders, North Yemeni migrants to the Gulf, and entre? 
preneurs from Aden, Asmara, Djibouti or Mombassa? 
were lured to the North's currency, real estate and import 
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markets, where they profited from the hefty share of remit? 
tances spent on consumer goods.6 
Extraordinarily unfettered currency and import mar? 
kets worked better for the North during the boom than 
the bust cycle. Global recession and depressed oil rents 
slashed remittance and aid levels, undermining, postpon? 
ing or eliminating private and public projects by the thou? 
sands. The Yemeni riyal (YR), having been kept artificial? 
ly high at a uniform rate of YR 4.5 to the dollar for over a 
decade (stimulating imports), plummeted to YR 18 to the 
dollar in the winter of 1986-87. Facing balance of payments 
and currency reserve crises from 1982 onwards, San'a tem? 
porarily banned all imports, blocked rampant smuggling, 
reformed and enforced tax codes and, in late 1986, took over 
currency markets and halted new investment projects.7 
The secondhand bonanza in the North was gone, and with 
it the "hands-off' policy of economic nonmanagement. 
Ownership and Investment 
Ideologies differed from plans, and plans from outcomes. 
At best, the North's capitalist orientation and the South's 
socialism represented tendencies or goals, for both were 
really "mixed" economies. 
The relative contribution of private and public capital 
can be measured in several ways. The North experienced 
a trend during the oil boom away from private capital 
formation towards public investment. In 1975, the private 
sector provided two-thirds and the state only one-third, 
but these proportions were reversed by 1982. By 1987, the 
North Yemen government financed three-quarters of invest? 
ments in agriculture, fisheries, transport and communi? 
cations, and nearly all utilities and mining development? 
amounting to two-thirds of all investment. Individuals 
funded most new construction, trade and hotel business, 
and 70 percent of manufacturing. Private investors' pref? 
erence for real estate speculation over agricultural pro? 
duction was particularly disconcerting to planners; where? 
as overall growth was a healthy 6.6 percent, in agriculture 
it was only 2.4 percent.8 
Nor was the South ever an entirely state-owned econ? 
omy. The nationalizations of 1969 affected foreign finan? 
cial, trade and services businesses. Between 1973 and 1976, 
consolidation of state and joint industrial ventures con? 
tinued, reducing the contribution of private domestic firms 
to industrial production from 51 percent to 38 percent, and 
the contribution of foreign firms from 36 percent to 10 per? 
cent. In fishing, however, foreign investors replaced some 
cooperative production. By 1976, private domestic and for? 
eign firms held about 40 percent of the construction mar? 
ket, and local private transportation had over half the mar? 
ket. Cooperatives were credited with 71 percent of 
agricultural output, and the state with the rest, but live? 
stock production was over 90 percent private.9 This was 
as "socialist" as the South got. 
In Aden's plan for 1981-1985 targets for private invest? 
ments increased, and during the first three years of the 
plan private sector participation exceeded expectations by 
eight percent, mostly in agriculture and local private fish? 
ing.10 The 1988 census reported that of nearly 35,000 estab? 
lishments, 75 percent were private, 21 percent govern? 
mental, and the remainder cooperative or joint ventures. 
Just over a quarter of the workforce was in the govern? 
ment sector.11 
All these figures are estimates that probably understate 
subsistence, smuggling and some informal trade. Cum? 
ulatively the evidence is sufficient to conclude that state 
and private sectors each played significant roles in both 
economies. There is little sign of sharp contrasts between 
centralized public ownership in the South and private 
enterprise in the North. Although their revolutions com? 
mitted them to divergent paths, 20 years of practice pro? 
duced convergent patterns. The explanation lies in the 
development projects supported by foreign donors. 
Foreign Finance 
Before the first Yemeni oil discovery in 1984, Yemen 
depended on aid rather than foreign companies for capi? 
tal investment. International "soft" loans to the public sec? 
tor represented the largest single source of new capital for? 
mation between 1970 and 1990. International companies 
participated either as contractors on donor-financed or 
nationalized state projects, where they earned profits 
but committed no capital, or as minority partners in pub? 
lic enterprises, to which they brought both capital and 
expertise. Once the oil industry began to take off, foreign 
private and public firms competed for roles in Yemen as 
contractors, partners and investors. 
The foreign-owned private sector in the PDRY had been 
slight. BP and Cable & Wireless did contract work for state 
corporations. BP, Mobil and a joint Yemeni-Kuwaiti com? 
pany supplied petroleum. Planners spoke of foreign firms 
as a source of capital for development, and a few Arab, 
Asian and Eastern European firms entered the market.12 
In the North, the Arab world's most liberal foreign invest? 
ment policies attracted only a few foreign ventures, which 
raised much of their capital locally. Canada Dry, Ramada 
and Sheraton were the most visible; since the hotels import? 
ed their own staffs, only the locally-owned bottler was a 
source of significant jobs. Other companies bought shares 
of Yemeni public corporations: a subsidiary of British 
Rothman had a 25 percent partnership and five expatri? 
ate employees in the National Tobacco & Matches 
Company, and the Saudi Al-Ahli Commercial Bank and 
Bank of America together owned 45 percent of the 
International Bank of Yemen.13 Citibank found an econ? 
omy where two-thirds of the cash circulated outside the 
formal banking system to be an unprofitable market. Scores 
of American, Arab, Asian and European contractors were 
active with donor projects: in roads, for instance, American 
and European engineers, Lebanese contractors, and South 
Korean and Chinese workforces (cheaper and more skilled 
than Yemenis) were not unusual. 
By the 1980s, the overall patterns of external financing 
in the two Yemens were remarkably similar. For more than 
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a decade, the West and the conservative states of the penin? 
sula had shunned the South, and the Soviet Union, its 
allies, China, and radical Arab regimes were also the 
North's main benefactors. The global and regional mul? 
tilateral agencies did work with the South, however, led 
by the World Bank's International Development 
Association (IDA). After 1980 the easing of tensions on 
the Peninsula prompted Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Abu 
Dhabi to offer assistance; by the middle of the decade, 
Arab funds surpassed assistance from socialist countries.14 
In North Yemen the Arab oil monarchies were the most 
visible donors in the 1970s, and the IDA exercised the 
most influence in economic policy. North Yemen's devel? 
opment assistance peaked in about 1981 at over $1 bil? 
lion, and declined to half that amount in 1985 and to less 
than $100 million in 1988. 
By that time, both countries relied on a similar list of 
donors and creditors. Grants were normally limited to 
small-scale technical assistance programs from the UN or 
European donors, or showy "gifts" from wealthy Gulf mon? 
archs. Most new capital formation came from "soft" loans 
with low interest charges and long repayment schedules. 
Thus debts accumulated against the accounts of interna? 
tional benefactors roughly in proportion to the amount of 
aid provided.15 The extent of polarization between "social? 
ist" and "capitalist" trends was mitigated by the fact of 
Arab, IDA, Soviet, Chinese and European loans for both 
development programs. Infrastructural projects were the 
bedrock of government development investment. Bilateral 
donors chose their own design, engineering and construc? 
tion firms, and global and Arab multilaterals applied the 
World Bank bids and tender system.16 
Utilities?immense industrial plants supplying urban 
water and power nationwide?were also financed from diverse 
sources. After studying the South's poorly functioning Soviet- 
built system, World Bank economists recommended an all- 
Yemen electrification grid to maximize economies of scale, 
and IDA initiated financing for this joint grid in the mid- 
1980s. While not the first joint North-South venture, this 
involved unprecedented inter-Yemeni coordination. 
Integrated rural development (IRD) was the Western 
and multilateral agencies' strategy to equip rural regions 
with roads, utilities, and some social services. The most 
prominent IRD projects throughout Yemen followed the 
World Bank model, whereby infrastructure, credit and 
technical assistance stimulate rural investments by indi? 
viduals or cooperatives. They were introduced in the areas 
of North Yemen best suited to intensive cash farming: 
the semi-tropical Tihama plain and the temperate south? 
ern uplands. By 1987 integrated projects, with different 
components from IDA, UN organizations, several Arab 
funds and the European Economic Community, at least 
theoretically covered most of rural Yemen. 
These schemes followed a similar pattern in both coun? 
tries. The South's largest IRD project, the Wadi Hadramawt 
project, stressing road construction, groundwater studies, 
deep wells mechanization and credit through cooperatives 
for fertilizers and pesticides, was modeled on the Tihama 
Development Authority project.17 The only difference was 
that in the South credit was available exclusively to coop? 
eratives, whereas in the North, private loan applications 
were also accepted. Had farmers flocked to mortgage their 
land for bank loans (other than for qat, disallowed from 
loan applications), this might have been a significant dif? 
ference; instead, credit officers in both systems bemoaned 
the lack of applications, and public spending in agricul? 
ture far outpaced private and/or cooperative financing. 
Petroleum 
The latest stage in the convergence of the two Yemeni 
economies occurred in the nascent petroleum industry. 
Here the convergence was literal: deposits discovered in 
the North/South border region were jointly developed by 
the two states in cooperation with international firms. 
Both state petroleum companies relied on foreign exper? 
tise. Soviet petroleum companies conducted on- and off? 
shore studies for South, and by the late 1970s conces? 
sions were won or under negotiation by British, French, 
Italian, Spanish, Kuwaiti and Brazilian firms. Thirteen 
international firms had explored in the North. In 1984, 
Yemen Hunt, then a wholly-owned local subsidiary of 
Texas-based Hunt Oil, made the first significant discov? 
ery, beyond Marib near the joint border. Soon Exxon, and 
then a consortium of South Korean firms, bought into 
Yemen Hunt; Texaco, Elf Aquitaine, Total, Canadian 
Occidental, and USSR firms negotiated and paid to drill 
for Yemeni oil. The Soviet company Technoexport made 
a major find in 1986 at Shabwa, across the intra-Yemeni 
border from Marib. Discoveries in turn created scores of 
sub-contracting opportunities for suppliers and builders 
from around the globe, such as the US firm that built a 
small modular refinery near Marib and a Lebanese-Italian- 
German group that laid the pipeline. There were new com? 
mercial finds in 1987,1988 and 1989.1s 
Realization of the commercial potential of the Marib- 
Shabwa basin required both inter-Yemeni cooperation 
and foreign capital and expertise. Not only was security 
around oil fields astride their common border improved 
by joint production, but the North hoped to use existing 
facilities at Aden, including the port and the refurbished 
BP refinery, which in turn needed the business. 
Cooperation avoided both conflict and duplication. The 
two national petroleum companies merged their opera? 
tions into a joint Yemen Company for Investment in Oil 
and Mineral Resources, which signed a production agree? 
ment in late 1989 with an international consortium con? 
sisting of Hunt and Exxon (with 37.5 percent between 
them), the Kuwait Foreign Petroleum Exploration 
Corporation (25 percent), Total (18.75 percent), and two 
subsidiaries of Technoexport, Machinoexport and 
Zarughgeologia (18.75 percent).19 
This commercial agreement culminated the 20-year con? 
vergence of two ideologically different systems on a com? 
mon, and eventually joint, pattern of public-foreign part? 
nership on the "commanding heights." A more "mixed" 
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venture could hardly be imagined, for the whole package 
included not just the joint Yemeni corporation but two of 
the largest capitalist oil giants, Exxon and Total, and Soviet 
and Kuwaiti state corporations. Destined to overshadow 
the value of property and investment in other sectors, this 
technically public venture was shortly followed by the polit? 
ical unity accord. 
Thus the flow of capital into Yemen as aid and remit? 
tances created systems dominated by "development pro? 
jects" on the one hand and "uncaptured" farming, migra? 
tion and informal sector trade on the other. Recessions in 
international oil prices and worldwide assistance cutbacks 
seriously disrupted both economies, leading to draconian 
austerity measures in the North and contributing to the out? 
break of factional strife in Aden in early 1986. The discov? 
ery of oil gave Yemen access to a new source of foreign financ? 
ing, corporate investment, and the promise of hard currency 
revenues. Oil rents, unlike aid, would strengthen the power 
of Yemeni policy makers by financing the general account 
rather than earmarked projects. 
Many of the arguments advanced for unity stressed the 
economic advantages, such as combining Aden port facili? 
ties with the North's private transport network, utilizing 
both the South's professional cadres and northern-based 
entrepreneurs, taking advantage of larger markets and 
economies of scale and maintaining all existing foreign trade 
and aid relationships. The prospect of economic improve? 
ment offered considerable popular appeal because of wide? 
spread political unease and economic dissatisfaction in both 
polities, personal and social ties of the northern bourgeoisie 
to families or places in the South, political leaders' cross? 
cutting ties, and a common sense of nationalism. 
Articles 7 and 8 of the constitution approved in popular 
referendum in May 1991 call for a mixed economy based 
on "Islamic social justice in production and social rela? 
tions," a developed public sector "capable of owning the 
basic means of production," "the preservation of private 
ownership," and "scientific planning which leads to the 
establishment of public corporations engaged in exploit? 
ing the national and public resources, developing capa? 
bilities of and opportunities for the public, private, and 
mixed sectors." 20 The government budget approved in 
February 1991 listed recurrent and capital expenditures 
for 91 production-oriented public firms, 40 service-oriented 
public companies and boards, and 17 mixed ownership cor? 
porations.21 More "socialist heritage" has been retained 
in Yemen than in Germany. 
Before any economic benefits of unification could be real? 
ized, the Gulf crisis disrupted the flow of remittances and 
aid from Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Newly unem? 
ployed migrants and their families, numbering upwards 
of a million, streamed into the cities just as operating funds 
in many social services sectors drained away.22 By early 
1991, the value of the riyal, having stabilized at about 
YR 13 to the dollar, collapsed to YR 26 to the dollar. The 
government suspended civil service salaries to cover the 
costs of currency support and vital operations. By that sum? 
mer, unemployment, inflation and the strains on hous? 
ing and services prompted public marches and demon? 
strations. Oil revenues were not only insufficient to cover 
the losses of foreign exchange, but they were threatened 
by Saudi claims to oil in the border region.23 Once again, 
politics abroad and changes in the world economy disrupted 
Yemen's economic plans. ? 
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